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Abstract. Underground forums contain many thousands of active users,
but the vast majority will be involved, at most, in minor levels of de-
viance. The number who engage in serious criminal activity is small.
That being said, underground forums have played a significant role in
several recent high-profile cybercrime activities. In this work we apply
data science approaches to understand criminal pathways and characte-
rize key actors related to illegal activity in one of the largest and longest-
running underground forums. We combine the results of a logistic regres-
sion model with k-means clustering and social network analysis, verifying
the findings using topic analysis. We identify variables relating to forum
activity that predict the likelihood a user will become an actor of interest
to law enforcement, and would therefore benefit the most from interven-
tion. This work provides the first step towards identifying ways to deter
the involvement of young people away from a career in cybercrime.
Keywords: Cybercrime, Underground forums, Social behaviour, Crim-
inal pathways
1 Introduction
Cybercrimes carried out by organized groups using custom tools with politi-
cal or military motivations capture the public imagination. However, the vast
majority of attacks are committed by actors with a low level of technical sophis-
tication [24,34]. While these may receive less media attention, they can cause
large financial losses and be costly to defend against [3]. This criminality is to
a great extent promoted by an active underground economy where attack tools
and services are traded, and cyber attacks are monetised [2].
Online underground forums bring together individuals interested in cyber-
crime and illicit online monetizing techniques [22,12]. In contrast with other
forms of crypto-markets [31], some of the contents of these forums are legal, such
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as discussions relating to current events, gaming, and technology-related issues.
However, these forums are also used to exchange information about deviant be-
haviour, and trade in goods and services with an illicit origin or application.
Previous research has found these forums can provide a stepping stone towards
more serious online criminal activities [13,14].
The underground economy attracts actors that are unlikely to be involved
in traditional crime, but who may become involved in cybercrime [23]. For ex-
ample, the use of booter services for ‘DDoSing’ others has become a widespread
phenomenon among school-aged children, and even victims can become attack-
ers [24]. This is due to the ease of access to hacking tools, the sense of anonymity
provided by the Internet, and the perceived lack of law enforcement online.
Cybercrime has proliferated in recent years, and online forums have become
a key source of data for researchers (see Section 2 for related work). While in-
sightful, this research has mainly relied on cross-sectional data, analysing forum
content from short periods of time or focussing on particular areas of cyber-
crime. Typically, researchers have considered only the tools and technologies ad-
versaries use, not their motivations or personal context [10]. Understanding not
only ‘what’ is traded in underground economies, but also ‘why’ and by ‘whom’
can provide insights into ways to tackle cybercrime from multiple perspectives.
The evolution of offenders, understanding how they learn to commit crime over
time, is a key aspect of this. Multidisciplinary research on the behavioural as-
pects of cybercrime is necessary to develop defences aimed at understanding and
preventing incidents, rather than stopping or recovering from them.
In this paper, we analyse the characteristics and pathways of ‘key actors’; fo-
rum users who have been linked to criminal activities, such as providing services
and tools to disrupt systems and networks or using these tools to perform at-
tacks. We use a variety of sources to identify these actors (see Section 3). While
we do not publish this list for ethical reasons (see Section 6), activities linked
to these key actors include providing DDoS as a service, distributing malware,
operating bot shops and pay-per-install services, as well as providing services for
web exploitation and account cracking. Characterizing key actors and analysing
their evolution within forums is beneficial for various reasons. From a social
perspective, it is the first step towards identifying ways to deter people away
from criminal activities. From the cybersecurity perspective, these actors pro-
vide state-of-the art tools and techniques that can be used for attacking systems.
This information can be used by response teams and security firms to focus their
attention, increasing their capacity to react rapidly to new forms of attack.
We focus our study on Hackforums, one of the largest underground forums.
Hackforums is well established, operating since 2007. While this forum is known
to be overrun by novice teenage hackers (contemptuously dubbed ‘script kid-
dies’), in the last few years there have been a number of high profile attacks
directly related to products distributed through this forum. For example, in
September 2016, the Mirai source code was released on the forum, which led to
several related botnets being used for illegal activities such as DDoS attacks [4]
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or mining cryptocurrencies [21]. In the first three months of 2018, there have
been at least two cases relating to Hackforums users before the UK courts.
We use the CrimeBB dataset, which includes Hackforums data spanning from
2007 onwards and contains information about 572k user accounts [27]. We start
by identifying key actors on the forum. We first apply data science approaches
to present a longitudinal study of these key actors. Concretely we apply social
network analysis to analyse their social interests, natural language processing
to classify the type of information posted, and clustering to group the actors
based on forum activity. Our research uncovers common activity patterns and
the pathways taken over time in terms of interests and knowledge. Second we
develop tools to identify factors that predict involvement in cybercrime. These
tools use social network analysis, logistic regression, and clustering to preselect
a list of potential actors, and topic analysis to analyse the type of information
they post. Our findings suggest that combining the different techniques helps in
the prediction of potential actors. These tools can be applied to any particular
cybercrime domain, so we make them publicly available. The CrimeBB dataset
also contains data from other forums and is available to academic researchers
through data sharing agreements from the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre.1
2 Background and related work
The rise of cybersecurity incidents parallels the development of underground
economies, where attacking tools and services are easily accessible at low cost
or even for free [2]. For example, pay-per-install services outsource the task of
infecting a machine and allow miscreants to buy ‘installs’ for spreading their
malware [6]. Other common assets that can be found in underground forums are
bot shops and botnets [8], crypters and packers [30], or exploits [2].
Various authors have addressed the offenders perspective. Karami and McCoy
analysed leaked databases of booter services: websites providing DDoS for hire,
publicly marketed as network ‘stressers’, but offered in underground forums as
services to perform DDoS [16]. While mostly used to take down gaming servers,
booters are also used to attack medium-sized websites. Hutchings and Clayton
researched the provision of denial of service attacks, interviewing and surveying
the providers to ask how they began providing the services, and why [14]. They
found most operators were young men from North America. They had escalated
from using booter sites, to setting them up and running them themselves. They
were initially exposed to booter services through gaming and hacker communi-
ties. Financial gain was the main reason for providing services, but they also
reported they enjoyed the challenge of their activities.
Sood and Enbody analyse the provision of cybercrime tools and services,
identifying three type of actors in underground communities: providers or pro-
ducers, advertisers, and buyers [30]. Based on our analysis of underground fo-
rums, we add two new roles. First, re-distributors of modified versions of public
1 https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk/
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or leaked malware. This role includes users involved in the provision of encrypted
malware binaries, aimed at avoiding detection by antivirus software. The second
role we dub teachers: actors who provide tutorials for configuration and use of
various attack tools, sometimes accompanied by help-desk services.
According to the criminological theory of differential association, criminal
activities are normal behaviours learnt in interaction with others [33]. Learning
takes place by associating with others in personal groups. The content of what
is learnt includes specific techniques to commit crime, as well as the ‘definitions’
(mindset) favourable to committing crime [37]. In relation to cybercrime, there is
evidence that offenders associate with each other in physical space [18], but also
online, particularly through the use of online underground forums [10,15,38].
Understanding offender pathways allows society to consider the most ap-
propriate ways to divert potential offenders away from crime. For example, the
UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) [23] debriefed young people involved in
cybercrime activities, and found many were first exposed through their interest
in gaming. The NCA have subsequently been working with the video gaming
industry to deliver preventative interventions.
Underground forums serve as an entry point into cybercrime for potential
offenders. These forums also allow non-technical actors to learn how to commit
offences and develop their skills [29]. Normally these forums have well-defined
categories like “Hacking” or “Market”. Where authors are most active provides
insights into their interests and expertise [25]. Forum members have a public
profile with information such as the registration date, last access or time spent.
Most underground forums are publicly accessible on the surface web or the ‘dark
web’ (e.g. through Tor hidden services).
The success of underground economies relies on trust and informal social
control [1]. Various authors have analysed these behaviours using social network
analysis (SNA), for example to analyse the evolution of members in terms of
posts and private messages [22] or to understand specialization and develop-
ments of subcommunities [11]. The use of natural language processing (NLP) to
analyse underground forums is also a recurring technique, e.g. to analyse post
sentiment [19] or to identify the assets being traded or the currencies used [29,28].
3 Dataset
In this work we use the CrimeBB dataset [27], which contains data collected from
various underground forums. We focus our study on Hackforums, the largest
forum contained in this dataset, with more than 30m posts2 made by 572k user
accounts over more than 10 years. Hackforums is divided into nine categories:
Hacking, Technology, Coding, Gaming, Web, Market, Money (a miscellaneous
category for all sorts of money making methods), Graphics and Common (which
2 We refer to a whole website as a forum, on which pages are set aside for discus-
sion of defined topics in boards, with users participating in conversation threads via
individual posts.
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includes boards for discussion about various topics, such as entertainment or
politics, and boards intended for forum rules and suggestions).
3.1 Key Actors
We use the term ‘key actor’ to refer to forum users who have been linked to
cybercrime activities, such as distributing malware, offering off-the-shelf tools to
perform denial-of-service attacks or using these tools to attack others. A number
of approaches were utilised to identify key actors who are or have been active on
Hackforums. These approaches required manual effort and thus are not scalable.
In Section 5 we propose tools to automatically identify likely key actors.
1. Media sources were searched to identify reports relating to Hackforums users
being arrested or prosecuted for cybercrime activities (media included official
notifications from law enforcement agencies; forum threads; social media and
blog posts made by security researchers). We used Google extended search
to look for sources including keywords such as ‘arrested’ or ‘prosecuted’ and
‘hackforums’. Results often included the pseudonym used by the actor in the
forum. This method yielded 49 key actors.
2. A private security and intelligence company, Flashpoint, provided usernames
considered to be of interest due to their activities. This yielded 9 key actors.
3. For each actor identified using the methods above, we used SNA to find
their ‘closest’ neighbours (users of the forum who they interact with the
most). Then, we manually analyse the activity of these neighbours looking
for evidence of involvement in cybercrime activities (for instance, evidence of
providing illegal material such as malware or ‘booter’ services). This method
yielded a further 22 actors.
4. The final set of key actors are those providing tools aiming at disrupting
systems and/or networks. To identify these actors we had two approaches:
– We searched Hackforums for threads advertising the top 300 Remote
Access Trojans (RATs) reported in [36]. Again, from manual inspec-
tion we identified the owners/coders of RATs and the re-distributors of
modified versions (e.g. encrypted binaries aimed at avoiding antivirus
detection). We discarded actors who we believed to be only purporting
to be an owner (a stealer); and also actors distributing an infected ver-
sion of a binary with the intent of compromising other forum members.
This method yielded 35 key actors (there was some overlap with actors
previously extracted).
– We used ‘compilation’ threads from Hackforums, where popular tools
and services are listed accompanied with the corresponding thread where
it was first advertised. This method yielded 15 key actors.
In total, these methods yield 130 actors of interest to law enforcement: of
these, we were able to identify the accounts of 113 within the dataset. The
missing accounts might be due to accounts being removed or changes of the
pseudonyms which we were unable to track. Also, it should be noted that various
accounts might belong to the same actor.
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4 Characterizing key actors
Having identified 113 key actors, we applied a number of different data science
approaches to analyse the forum activity of these users, including NLP, SNA,
and machine learning algorithms.
4.1 Natural language processing
Due to the massive size of the dataset (more than 30m posts), it is not possible
to manually code the data. We use NLP tools to classify posts into categories.
Classification of interests and expertise of members enables the identification of
topics related to cybercrime offences, such as learning to attack systems or tra-
ding in stolen accounts. The data poses interesting problems for NLP techniques.
The language used by members of underground forums includes technical jargon
and non-standard means of expression. Contributors include non-native speak-
ers of English, and short texts in which information is conveyed in deliberately
concise ways. In this work we analyse the behavioural evolution of our identified
actors, firstly building a binary classifier to identify questions in CrimeBB.
Three annotators manually labelled 2,200 posts selected from a range of
boards, with substantial inter-annotator agreement for post type (see more de-
tails in [7]). We use the annotated dataset to train and test the classifier, with
a training subset of 175 annotated threads from various boards, and a test sub-
set of 186 annotated threads from another board (to prevent overfitting). For
each thread, we extract features using a set of statistical techniques and a set
of heuristics, having found this hybrid approach to work best [7]. The former
include the number of replies, the number of links in the first post (both to
external sources and to other threads in the forum), the length of the first post
and a set of unigram features extracted from text. We convert every thread ti-
tle and post into a document-term matrix (a matrix of counts with each word
occurring as column values, and each of the documents as a row). We strip
punctuation, convert to lower case characters, ignore numbers and exclude stop
words. Finally, word counts are transformed using TF-IDF (‘term frequency in-
verse document frequency’), a weighting that promotes words occurring fairly
frequently in few documents above those occurring highly frequently but ubi-
quitously across CrimeBB [32].
The heuristics are formed through our expertise in analysing forum data.
Concretely, for each thread we get the frequency of particularly interesting key-
words in the heading and first post (examples of these keywords are “looking
for”, “I need help” or “I have a question”). Finally, we also account for the
number of question marks in the heading.
We use a Linear SVM to build a classifier. Again, the selection of the algo-
rithm is based on previous experimentation with the dataset [7]. For evaluation
we use the usual metrics for information retrieval, i.e. precision, recall and F1.
Precision measures the fraction of actual questions retrieved among the total
of questions retrieved (including false positives). Recall, or sensitivity, measures
the fraction of questions retrieved among the total number of actual questions
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in the dataset. Finally, the F1 score combines in a single measure both precision
and recall. Our classifier has Precision=0.88, Recall=0.85 and F1=0.86. While
these metrics can be improved, the classifier is accurate enough to automatically
identify question threads, a task which would otherwise be infeasible due to the
size of the dataset.
4.2 Social network analysis
We designed and developed SNA tools to facilitate study of the forums at diffe-
rent levels of granularity, per board, per topic of interest, per year, etc. We build
the social network by processing the public interactions of the members. This
network is represented as a directed graph, where nodes are the members of the
forum and edges their interactions. We define a directed edge from node V to
node W if there is a reply from V to W. There are two possible forms of reply:
a) when V explicitly cites a post made by W; and b) when V replies in a thread
initiated by W. When available, we use information from reputation votes given
between members to classify the interactions as positive, negative or neutral.
We use classical SNA metrics such as centrality degrees to analyse the net-
work, i.e. in-degree (fraction of nodes its incoming edges are connected to), out-
degree (fraction of nodes its outgoing edges are connected to), and eigenvector
(measure of the influence of a node in a network). Additionally, we compute the
following metrics to measure the popularity of the forum users: total number
of replies; h-index (a member with h-index=n is author of n threads having at
least n replies); and the i-10-index, i-50-index and i-100-index (i.e. the number
of threads with at least 10, 50 and 100 replies respectively). These metrics are
used in academia to measure the productivity and impact of a scholar. We adopt
them to analyse underground forums for the same purpose.
We also developed tools to analyse the interests of forum members. This
allows us to study the networks of actors interested in particular topics. Interests
can be calculated for a given period, so we can analyse the evolution of different
actors (e.g. a member initially interested in gaming related boards who then
moved to hacking related boards). The interest of a member M in a board B is
calculated as:
I(M,B) = NT(M,B) ∗ 3 + NP(M,B)
Where N{T,P}(M,B) denotes the number of {threads, posts} written by M
in B. We assign triple weight to threads since initiating a thread represents a
greater interest than posting a reply.
4.3 Machine Learning - Clustering
Machine learning techniques can be applied to extract common characteristics
from a dataset. We apply k-means clustering to group the actors based on their
activity [17]. K-means partitions a set of n samples into k clusters (with k << n).
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We extract a set of 44 features for each actor, which can be classified as measures
relating to forum activity, social relations, and reputation measures.
Measures relating to forum activity includes the number of days be-
tween the first and last post, the number of posts and threads in each category
and the number of posts and threads in the currency exchange board. We ex-
plicitly include the currency exchange board (which is part of the marketplace)
as it characterizes the financial activities of the actors.
Network centrality measures are obtained from SNA. These include out-
degree, in-degree, eigenvector, h-index, and i-10 and i-100 indices.
Reputation measures are taken from the reputation systems used on the
forum. These include the overall reputation bestowed and prestige scores (pres-
tige is an forum metric based on activity). There are also counts for the number
of positive, negative, and zero-value reputation votes each account received.
Then, using the feature set we perform clustering using k-means. After ap-
plying the Elbow method [35] to analyse the within-group sum of squares for
various values of k, we set k = 5.
4.4 Results
Using the tools described above, we first analyse the social relations established
between key actors and their closest neighbours. Second, we analyse their com-
mon characteristics by splitting them into groups using k-means clustering. Fi-
nally, we analyse their pathways by looking for changes in their interests and
the number of questions posted as they spend more time in the forum.
Social relations Figure 1 shows the social network involving the key ac-
tors.3 The actors identified from media sources and Flashpoint are filled in red,
the ones identified from network analysis are orange and the those linked to mal-
ware distribution are blue. Colours of the edges represent the sentiment of the
relationship, calculated from the reputation votes sent to each other. Most key
actors are closely connected to each other, and most relationships are positive.
Actors obtained from different sources are closely or even directly connected. For
example, the detail in Figure 1 shows a member identified as malware distributor
(in blue) which is directly connected to one identified through SNA (in orange)
and very close to at least two actors identified from media sources (in red).
Some close neighbours (for example, the nodes tagged as ‘Bridge’ in the detail
from Figure 1) are connected to more than one key actor, and act as ‘bridges’
for connecting different groups. These actors are of interest since they might be
influential for or influenced by key actors in criminal activity. Accordingly, we
use these actors for our prediction study presented in Section 5.
Characterization Table 1 shows the average values for each of the five
clusters obtained by k-means. There is a small group of 5 actors who have the
highest measures of forum activity, are highly reputed (though they also receive
high negative votes), and have rich social relations. These 5 actors are popular
3 For the sake of visualization, the figure only shows the key actors and their five
closest repliers and replied neighbours (filled in green).
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Fig. 1. Social network graph involving key actors and their closest neighbours (green
nodes). Red nodes are those identified from media sources and Flashpoint, orange are
those identified through SNA and blue are those linked to the distribution of malware.
The colours in the edges represent the sentiment of the relationship (red=negative,
green=positive and black=neutral/unknown)
(due to the high values of their H and i indexes), have influence in the network,
and are well known in the community. The remaining clusters have also been
active for long time (more than 2 years) but differ in quantity of posts and
threads. The clusters are also differentiated by their areas of interests.
The cluster with 20 actors is most interested in the market section (followed
by the common section). They are the most active group in currency exchange
and have high social relationship measurements (e.g. on average they have 7.2
threads with more than 100 replies). Overall, actors in this cluster are likely to
be known in the community as prolific market traders.
The clusters with 27 and 37 members have similar interests (mostly in market
and hacking, but also in common and coding categories), though one has higher
reputation (mostly positive) and social relations (e.g. they have more than twice
the number of threads with at least 10 replies). Finally, the least active cluster,
which is composed of 24 actors, is interested firstly in hacking and then in the
market sections, with negligible posts in currency exchange.
Overall, cluster analysis suggests key actors are mostly characterized by their
interest in the market, common, and hacking areas. Also, they can be grouped
by their forum activity, with some being more active and popular, and thus well
known within the community, while others are less active, do not participate in
the common sections of the forum and are less popular.
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Table 1. Average values for key actors grouped in 5 clusters. The Inter-
ests columns show the top 3 categories and number of posts/threads in cur-
rency exchange. W=Web, G=Game, D=Code, T=Tech, C=Common, H=Hack,
$=Money, X=Graphics, M=Market. +=positive reputations, 0=neutral reputations
and -=negative reputations. EV=Eigenvector
#KeyActors Activity Interests Reputation Social relations
Days Threads/Posts cat1 cat2 cat3 #CurExc Total (+/0/-) H i10 i100 EV
27 1298.4 74.1/1138.4 M H C 3.9/7.6 229.8 (61.3/2.3/4.3) 10.4 15.4 1.1 0.00
37 1595.0 163.8/3338.1 M C D/H 6.4/19.9 482.8 (230.9/7.4/6.9) 17.6 41.7 3.0 0.01
5 1951.0 831.0/18086.2 C M H 23.8/125.4 896.8 (578.2/68.8/99.0) 53.6 373.0 23.2 0.04
24 796.4 18.0/413.0 H M C/D 0.0/1.0 120.1 (58.0/2.4/3.2) 5.0 4.5 0.3 0.00
20 1895.7 383.6/10989.2 M C H 27.4/141.8 667.9 (311.6/27.0/48.3) 28.4 99.8 7.2 0.02
Evolution We track the interests of the actors since they were registered
until their last visit (if enabled on their profile) or last post. We compute their
interests in each board and then aggregate them per category and per year. To
analyse temporal evolution, we measure the interests at the beginning, middle
and end of the period each actor has been active. The beginning is defined as
the year of their first post, the end is the year of their last post, and the middle
is the period in between. We then calculate the evolution of interests between
these periods by computing transitions of interest. Concretely, a transition of
interest from a category Ci in time t0 to a category Cj in time t1 is calculated
as:
T (Ct0i → Ct1j ) =
∑
∀A∈K
(|St0 | − βt0i ) ∗ λt0i + (|St1 | − βt1j ) ∗ λt1j
Where K is the set of all the key actors, Stn denotes the set of all categories
of interest for actor A in time tn, λ
tn
i denotes the normalized interest of actor A
in category Ci in time tn, and β
tn
i is the relative position of category i regarding
the ordered list of categories by score in time tn (i.e., the top category has β
t
i
equal to 1, the second equal to 2 and so on). The above equation weights the
categories of interest per actor according to the amount of posts and threads
posted in each category with respect to the rest.
Figure 2 shows the aggregated transitions for all key actors. Overall, ac-
tors are most interested in the hacking, market, and common categories. Over
their time in the forum, there is a slight increase of interest in the coding and
technology sections, and a decrease in the gaming sections. From this figure we
can draw several conclusions. First, in general actors are active participants in
non-criminal related boards, such as those from the common category. This sug-
gests their criminal activity runs in parallel or comes after other interests (e.g.
entertainment or gaming), and they are involved in other activities within the
community. Second, their high interest in the marketplace and money sections
indicates they may have financial motivations. Third, as they get older and more
experienced in the forum they are less likely to engage in gaming boards.
Prior research has found forums are used for sharing information and lear-
ning about cybercrime and deviant activities [10,15,38]. Thus, we analyse the
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Fig. 2. Evolution of interests of key actors from initial (left), halfway (middle) and end
(right) of their activity in Hackforums
evolution of the actors in terms of the number of questions (or requests for in-
formation) posted across time. In order to track evolution, this analysis includes
the 34 key actors who have been posting for at least 4 years. We count the num-
ber of posts and number of questions posted for each year since they wrote their
first post.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of questions posted per year with respect to
the total number of questions posted. Each row represents a different actor (the
top row shows the aggregation of the 34 actors). Most actors posted more than
half of all their questions during their first or second year of activity in the
forum. However, there are other actors (e.g. A1, A2, and A3) that keep posting
questions at a similar rate after 5 or 6 years of activity. We can confirm these
actors posted more questions in the early stages of their activity in the forums.
5 Predicting key actors
We analyse over a decade of data from Hackforums to identify those variables
relating to forum activity that predict the likelihood a user will eventually be
an actor of interest to law enforcement. Actors were selected for inclusion if
they had been active since 2009, and had made more than five posts on the
forum. This way, we do not consider old and low profile actors which would
otherwise introduce noise in our analysis. After the forum administrator was
excluded from the dataset, there were 245,636 cases extracted.4 Our prediction
framework is based on two steps: using multiple approaches to select potential
key actors based on their forum activity, and predicting which of these are key
actors based on the key terms used in their posts. We first combine the outputs
from a logistic regression model, k-means clustering and SNA to identify actors
4 The administrator is a well known actor in Hackforums
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Fig. 3. Proportion of the number of questions posted per year with respect to the total
questions posted
that are potentially involved in criminal activity. Second, we use topic analysis
to confirm whether these users are engaged in cybercrime related activity, such
as trading in illegal goods and services.
5.1 Logistic regression
We analyse the data applying backward stepwise logistic regression, using the
likelihood ratio method. This method starts with a model which includes every
independent variable, gradually removing every variable which does not have
a significant impact on the dependent variable. Field [9] justifies the use of
stepwise methods when carrying out exploratory research, in which there is no
previous research on which to base hypotheses for testing, as well as situations
in which causality is not of interest, but rather a model to fit the data. Both
these justifications apply for this research. Field also recommends that if stepwise
methods are to be used, then the backward method is the better option, as the
forward method has a higher risk of Type II (false negative) errors. Logistic
regression is often used in medical research, for example, to identify the risk
factors associated with a disease within the wider population.
Logistic regression models predict a categorical outcome, in this case key
actor status. Measures of forum activity, network centrality measures, and re-
putation measures (see Section 4.3) were considered for inclusion as predictor
variables, however due to multicollinearity issues, a number were excluded (an
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assumption of logistic regression is that independent variables are not highly co-
rrelated). The independent variables included in the initial model are the number
of days posting, reputation, prestige, posts and threads in the various categories,
h-index, i-50-index, i-100-index, and number of positive, negative and zero-value
reputation votes received.
As recommended by Field [9], 5 cases were removed as an analysis of the resi-
duals indicated they had an undue influence on the model (Cook’s Distance>1)
Without any independent variables in the model, 100% of cases are predicted
to not be key actors. The final model is significantly improved and is statisti-
cally better at predicting key actors (χ2(15, n=245,631)=641.2, p<.001). The
final model accounts for 34.1% of the variance, accurately predicting 11.1% of
known key actors with a low false error rate (0.00%). While predicting 12 out of
108 key actors may seem low, it is from a pool of almost a quarter of a million
cases. While not all the variance in the model will be explained through a user’s
forum activity, these significant results suggest this is an approach worthy of
further exploration. The analysis also provides predicted probabilities for each
user, which we explore further in Section 5.3.
Table 2 presents the results of the final step of the logistic regression analysis.
The table includes regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95%
confidence intervals for odds ratios for each of the 15 predictors retained in the
model. The odds ratios, shown as Exp(B), show how the odds of being in one
outcome category changes when the predictor variable increases by one unit.
Table 2. Logistic regression model predicting key actors
95% C.I. for Exp(B)
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
Step 15 DAYS POSTING .001 .000 19.407 .000 1.001 1.000 1.001
REPUTATION .001 .000 7.712 .005 1.001 1.000 1.001
PRESTIGE .006 .001 37.754 .000 1.006 1.004 1.008
POSTS HACK .001 .000 25.397 .000 1.001 1.000 1.001
POSTS MARKET .002 .000 65.945 .000 1.002 1.001 1.002
POSTS GAME -.006 .001 15.670 .000 .994 .991 .997
POSTS GRAPHICS -.009 .005 3.639 .056 .991 .982 1.000
POSTS CODE .0005 .000 5.144 .023 1.0005 1.0001 1.0008
POSTS COMMON -.0005 .000 4.945 .026 0.9995 .9991 0.9999
POSTS MONEY -.003 .002 3.718 .054 .997 .994 1.000
POSTS CURRENCY EXCHANGE -.006 .003 6.041 .014 .994 .988 .999
THREADS GRAPHICS -.044 .029 2.339 .126 .957 .905 1.012
THREADS COMMON -.007 .003 5.637 .018 .993 .987 .999
H INDEX .178 .017 108.025 .000 1.195 1.155 1.236
NEGATIVE REPUTATION .018 .006 7.383 .007 1.018 1.005 1.031
Constant -9.372 .191 2397.372 .000 .000
The odds ratios indicate that for each additional reputation and prestige
point bestowed, the odds a user is a key actor increases by 1.001 and 1.006
respectively. For every additional day actors are posting, the odds they are key
actors increases by 1.001. The frequency in which actors posted on various sec-
tions also predicts being a key actor, including posts in hacking (odds increased
by 1.001 for each post), market (1.002) and code (1.0005) sections. Posts in some
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sections decrease the odds that users are key actors, including gaming (0.994),
graphics (0.991, but this variable is not significant), common (0.9995), money
(0.997, but not significant), and currency exchange (0.994). New threads initi-
ated in the common and graphics sections decreases the odds a forum user is a
key actor by 0.993 and 0.957 respectively, although graphics is not significant.
An increase in a user’s h-index increases their likelihood of being a key actor
by 1.195. Key actors can also be predicted by their negative reputation (odds
increase by 1.018 for each negative reputation).
5.2 Clustering
In addition to the logistic regression, we apply k-means clustering to the subset
of more than 245k Hackforums actors. Table 3 shows the average values for each
cluster applying k-means, using k=14, and which clusters the 113 key actors
are grouped in. In the smallest cluster, 22 of 223 actors are key actors (9.9%).
Actors from this cluster are very active, positively reputed and popular, and are
most interested in the market, common, hacking, and gaming sections. Another
small cluster of 2387 actors contains 31 key actors (1.3%). The profile is similar
to the previous one, although the measurements are lower. Finally, the bulk of
key actors (31) fall in a cluster with more than 10k actors, which is relatively
smaller than other clusters. Again, the interests are within the market, common,
hacking and gaming sections.
Most of the key actors are enclosed within the clusters with the fewest number
of actors (relative to other clusters). This finding is interesting since it allows to
reduce the amount of actors requiring thorough investigation when looking for
criminal activity.
Table 3. Average values for actors grouped in 14 clusters. The Interests
columns show the top 3 categories and number of posts/threads in currency ex-
change. W=Web, G=Game, D=Code, T=Tech, C=Common, H=Hack, $=Money,
X=Graphics, M=Market. +=positive reputations, 0=zero reputations and -=negative
reputations. EV=Eigenvector
#KeyActors / Activity Interests Reputation Social relations
Total Days Threads/Posts cat1 cat2 cat3 #CurExc Total (+/0/-) H i10 i100 EV
1/8397 388.9 6.6/50.2 T/H H/C C/M 0.0/0.1 1.3 (0.4/0.0/0.1) 2.2 0.5 0.0 0.00
32/10323 1322.2 114.5/1310.2 M/C C/M G/H 3.5/9.8 113.9 (50.0/3.2/5.0) 11.6 17.4 0.5 0.00
0/4590 326.2 5.3/48.0 W H M/C 0.0/0.1 1.8 (0.6/0.1/0.1) 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.00
13/55364 338.6 7.3/46.4 H M C 0.0/0.1 0.7 (0.5/0.1/0.2) 2.3 0.5 0.0 0.00
9/41774 518.7 13.9/109.9 M H/C C/H 0.3/1.3 9.6 (3.4/0.3/0.5) 2.9 1.2 0.0 0.00
1/24202 310.9 5.7/56.2 G H/C M/H 0.0/0.1 2.0 (0.8/0.1/0.3) 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.00
0/36392 246.8 6.9/75.4 C H M 0.0/0.2 2.5 (1.1/0.2/0.4) 2.1 1.0 0.0 0.00
0/3474 296.3 3.8/90.6 T H C 0.0/0.1 4.1 (1.0/0.1/0.1) 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.00
0/14050 339.4 4.2/46.6 $ H M/C 0.0/0.1 0.9 (0.4/0.1/0.1) 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.00
22/223 2111.7 611.2/11614.6 C M G/H 30.7/187.6 1170.7 (711.8/20.8/31.5) 32.2 162.8 8.2 0.03
3/9177 403.4 7.7/75.9 D H C 0.0/0.1 3.1 (1.1/0.1/0.2) 2.2 0.6 0.0 0.00
0/4845 302.2 6.9/71.0 X H/C M/H 0.0/0.1 5.1 (1.2/0.1/0.1) 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.00
31/2387 1723.8 295.9/4339.6 C M G 11.5/31.8 360.5 (170.2/9.8/13.8) 19.3 57.9 1.9 0.01
1/30437 215.8 0.2/18.2 H M C/$ 0.0/0.0 0.2 (0.1/0.0/0.1) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.00
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5.3 Predicting actors using topic analysis
So far we have characterized and predicted actors based on features relating to
forum activity, reputation and social behaviour. This provides a subset of actors
who share common forum behaviour with those linked to illegal activities. To
further refine the list of potential key actors, we pose the following research
questions: What are the key actors talking about? Can we classify actors based
on their topics of conversation? Next, we analyse the most frequent topics used by
key actors. Then, we perform topic analysis on a selection of potential key actors
obtained from the logistic regression, social network analysis and clustering.
Analysis of topics used by key actors. We use topic analysis to extract
the most common terms from threads initiated by each actor. Topic analysis
is an information retrieval task which produces wordlists summarised with a
topic. Concretely, we apply latent Dirichelt allocation (LDA) to obtain the topics
and terms that best represent the language used for each actor. Given a set of
documents, LDA extracts the topics that best describe these documents [5]. A
document is composed with the heading and first post of each thread initiated
by an actor. We preprocess the data by tokenizing it, removing stop words,
punctuation characters and numbers. Then, we extract the nouns using a Part-
of-Speech (POS) tagger using the Penn Treebank tagset [20]. Using common
NLP tools with low-resource language corpora presents limitations. Nevertheless,
for this particular task the application of the POS tagger for extracting nouns
reduces the number of noisy words.
For each actor, we extract 4 topics with 7 words per topic, resulting in 28
terms. Table 4 shows the most frequent terms used by the key actors (we show
those used by more than five actors). The most common term is ‘rat’ (Remote
Access Trojan) which could be expected given a bulk of key actors were identified
due to their links with RAT coding. Various terms relate to offensive tools, such
as ‘bot’, ‘booter’, ‘crypter’ and ‘fud’ (‘fully undetectable’). Words related to com-
merce include ‘paypal’, ‘btc’ (Bitcoin), ‘lr’ (Liberty Reserve, a digital currency
provider which was shut down in 2013), ‘free’, and ‘cheap’. Also noteworthy is
the high frequency of the words ‘help’, ‘need’ or ‘question’.
Table 4. Most frequent terms used by the key actors. In parentheses are the number
of key actors using each term. In bold are terms related to cybercrime.
rat (46), help (45), paypal (43), need (36), free (34), btc (34), account (33), thread (31), lr (28), server (26), new (25)
crypter (25), pp (25), source (23), fud (23), service (22), bot (21), question (20), hf (16), code (15), steam (15), site (14)
shell (14), cheap (14), money (14), skype (14), booter (13), window (12), anyone (12), tut (12), file (12), uid (11), someone (11)
system (10), vbnet (10), vpn (10), installs (10), please (10), member (10), php (10), problem (10), ddos (10), password (10)
website (10), update (10), setup (9), minecraft (9), email (9), game (9), vps (9), facebook (8), list (8), proxy (8), design (8)
darkcomet (8), keylogger (8), irc (8), java (8), coder (8), day (8), time (8), net (7), post (7), product (7), tool (7), beta (7)
sale (7), exploit (7), people (7), bitcoin (7), buying (7), stealer (6), version (6), stresser (6), live (6), feature (6)
botnet (6), domain (6), signature (6), shop (6), black (6), omc (6), web (6), year (6), support (6), official (6), youtube (6)
Selection of potential key actors. After analysing the most frequent terms
used by key actors, we repeat the topic analysis with a subset of potential key
actors identified from our previous analyses. The logistic regression provides
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predicted probabilities for each forum user. We obtain a subset (named LogReg)
by selecting those with a predicted probability of 10% or more of being a key
actor (n=88). From the clustering analysis we select 201 users (named Clust)
from the cluster which contained the highest ratio of key actors (see Table 3).
Finally, from our social network analysis, we select 42 actors (named SNA)
directly connected with at least 3 key actors (see Figure 1). There are common
actors between subsets: 10 actors appear in the three subsets; 26 appear in the
LogReg and Clust subsets, but not the SNA; and 7 appear in the SNA and Clust
subset, but not the LogReg. There are no overlaps between only the LogReg and
SNA subsets. The final subset of potential key actors includes 285 forum users.
Predicting key actors. We apply topic analysis to the potential actors,
extracting their 28 most common terms. We then measure the number of com-
mon terms with those obtained for the key actors to get a similarity score. This
score is calculated as the number of terms matching the list of terms from key
actors (Table 4) divided by the total number of terms extracted for the ac-
tor. However, similarities may be due to commerce-related terms (e.g. ‘btc’ or
‘cheap’) or forum-related terms (‘need’, ‘thread’ or ‘help’). Thus, we also look
for particularly interesting terms related with hacking (highlighted in Table 4).
As a prediction threshold, we establish a minimum distance of 0.2 (i.e. at
least a 20% of the terms must match with those observed in the key actors) and
a minimum number of 2 keywords observed.5 Table 5 summarizes our findings.
Using these thresholds, we predict 22 actors from the LogReg subset, 34 from
the Clust subset and 9 from the SNA subset. We also predict 8 actors from the
overlap of the LogReg and Clust subsets. From the 10 actors that were common
in the three subsets, 7 are predicted to be key actors. The closest members to
key-actors according to their topics are those identified with clustering. However,
only 20% of users from this subset are predicted to be key actors. Meanwhile,
42% of the users from the logistic regression subset are predicted to be key
actors. Our findings suggest combining different data science techniques assists
in the prediction of potential key actors.
Overall, from the list of 285 potential key actors, 80 are predicted to be
of interest. Our estimation confirms i) these are actors with a similar activity
profile, interest and social behaviour as those identified manually, and ii) they
talk about similar, hacking-related terms. Thus, we can conclude that these
actors are either involved or close to involvement in cybercrime activities, and
thus might benefit the most from intervention. Also, monitoring these actors
could be of interest for security firms and intelligence agencies. A manual analysis
of the forum activity of these actors confirms that they are all providing or asking
for illegal assets and services such as malware, booters or stolen accounts.
5 These thresholds were chosen after exploratory experimentation with the dataset
and manually inspecting the results
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Table 5. Summary of prediction using topic analysis
Subset Predicted/Total (%) Avg. distance Farthest Closest
LogReg 22/52 (42.31) 0.43 0.10 0.72
Clust 34/165 (20.61) 0.66 0.29 0.93
SNA 9/25 (36.00) 0.57 0.36 0.75
LogReg & Clust 8/26 (30.77) 0.63 0.36 0.89
SNA & Clust 0/7 (0.00) 0.66 0.50 0.79
LogReg & Clust & SNA 7/10 (70.00) 0.60 0.43 0.68
6 Ethical considerations
The research methodology was designed with ethical considerations at the fore-
front. The department’s research ethics committee gave their approval for the
research project. Furthermore, we complied with the Cambridge Cybercrime
Centre’s data sharing agreements. While the data are publicly available (and the
forum users are aware of this), it could be used by malicious actors, for example
to deanonymize users based on their posts. It was impossible for us to obtain
informed consent from users as that would require us to identify them first. In
accordance with the British Society of Criminology’s Statement on Ethics, this
approach is justified as the dataset is collected from the public Internet, and is
used for research on collective behaviour, without aiming to identify particular
members. Further precautions taken include not identifying individuals (includ-
ing not publishing usernames), and presenting results objectively.
7 Limitations
We have presented a longitudinal study of behavioural aspects of key actors in
underground forums. This research has attempted to overcome the significant
difficulties in this challenging area of research. However, a number of limitations
remain. First, results are based on the observation of a single forum. Thus, we
do not analyse actors operating on other forums, nor do we measure actors’
activities that occur off-forum. Future work will analyse cross-forum behaviour.
Second, we focus on external sources to identify key actors, and thus our results
could be biased by feedback from these sources. Moreover, the proportion of
identified key actors in the forum is low, hindering the use of reliable classification
techniques such as supervised machine learning. Third, our definition of the
social network relies on public interactions. Unlike previous works [22,11], we
do not use private messages to refine social relations. Recent work shows that
public and private relations differ [26]. Finally, evaluating if the predicted actors
are actually involved into criminal activities is not straightforward, even with
manual analysis. Investigations into actors to produce evidence they are involved
in cybercrime is a matter for law enforcement. Instead, our research helps to focus
the spotlight, with the aim of informing crime prevention efforts.
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8 Conclusion
Underground forums are one of the key pillars for the rise of underground
economies. The sense of anonymity they provide, together with the ease of ac-
cess to attack tools and services make these forums attractive places for young,
non-skilled people to learn about hacking. Analysing the evolution of these low-
level hackers makes it possible to consider early intervention approaches, with
the aim of deterring their involvement away from criminal activities. Addition-
ally, understanding who the key actors are, and what new tools they provide,
is helpful for rapidly adapting to new forms of attack. For example, antivirus
vendors could monitor those providing tools aimed at bypassing detection and
new variants of malware.
We have conducted a large scale analysis of key actors from one of the largest
English-speaking underground forums. We have evidence of online social connec-
tions between these key actors, and our research uncovers various common roles
for these key actors. For example, some are well known in the community and
actively participate in non-illicit sections. Others are less active and focus their
activity in the market and monetization processes. Also, we note an evolution of
interests towards more market and hacking related topics, as well as a decrease
in threads requesting help or asking questions.
Finally, we have developed tools for detection and prediction of actors in-
volved in cybercrime activities. These tools help to identify user accounts that
might require further investigation by law enforcement and security firms moni-
toring underground communities and also for early deployment of new counter-
measures or adaptation of existing ones. The tools used during this research are
publicly available in our git repository.6
The purpose of our research is not to track and pursue criminal offenders,
but understand who is at risk of becoming involved in crime, so as to apply
intervention approaches at early stages. Identifying those that might be at risk
of becoming involved in crime is critical for early intervention. Preventing young
people from becoming involved in cybercrime will be of benefit for them later in
life, as contact with the criminal justice system can be a stigmatising experience,
affecting later job prospects and legitimate opportunities.
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